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ESSAY
FEAR, LEGAL INDETERMINACY, AND THE AMERICAN
LAWYERING CULTURE
by
Michael Hatfield*
On August 1, 2002, then Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee signed for
President Bush a memorandum of law concluding that some torture was not
necessarily illegal if the President ordered it. This Essay examines how Bybee
could arrive at a conclusion that is fundamentally at odds with both our national
moral spirit and our law. In doing so, it cautions American lawyers to recognize
the difference between what is "legal" and what is "arguably legal, " and to be
aware of their own extra-legal biases when interpreting the law.
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18 U.S.C. Section 2340A, Torture.
(a) Offense.-Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to
commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned
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LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
for any term of years or for life.
(b) Jurisdiction.-There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in
subsection (a) if--() the alleged offender is a national of the United
States; or(2) the alleged offender is present in the United States,
irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.
(c) Conspiracy.-A person who conspires to commit an offense under
this section shall be subject to the same penalties (other than the penalty
of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of
which was the object of the conspiracy.
I. VOICE: THE POWER OF LAWYERS
Despite our usual talk about what the law says on some subject, the law
does not say anything. It is mute. It is lawyers who do the saying on behalf of
the law. It is in legal advice that the law comes to life, or doesn't, as the case
may be.
In understanding how torture of enemy prisoners came to be, at least for a
brief period of recent history, not a covert, plausibly deniable American
interrogation technique, but an allegedly legal one, the important question is
not about American law. The important question is about the lawyer who failed
to voice the law when asked. How is it that on August 1, 2002, then Assistant
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee signed' for President Bush's guidance a (now
infamous) memorandum of law concluding that torture was not illegal-at least
not always-if the President ordered it?2 What went wrong with the lawyer,
who was supposed to give voice to the law's prohibitions? The pivotal issues
are not about American laws but American lawyers.
What follows is a cautionary tale for lawyers, not a legal critique. It is in
response to the sentiment recently expressed by one scholar that the Torture
1 Although Jay S. Bybee signed the memorandum, others were involved in drafting it.
John Choon Yoo was substantially involved in the drafting of the memorandum. The
addressee of the memo was Alberto Gonzales, who presumably had reviewed prior drafts
and did not return the memorandum for further revisions or refining. After the memorandum
was written, Bybee was appointed by the President to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (the Senate confirmed him to this lifetime appointment within two months,
though the memorandum was apparently unknown to members of the Senate at the time).
Mr. Gonzales was appointed by the President to become the Attorney General of the United
States. Professor Yoo returned to his position as a member of the faculty at Boalt Hall
School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, from where he continues to assert almost
universally condemned legal interpretations (supporting assassinations, for example) and
continues to hear calls for his professional discipline for doing so. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett,
A Young Lawyer Helps Chart Shift In Foreign Policy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005, at Al;
Dana Priest et al., Justice Department Memo Says Torture "May Be Justified, " WASH. POST,
June 13, 2004, at A3. However, since Bybee was the official author of the memorandum, he
will be referenced as the author.
2 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Torture Memo], available at
http://files.findlaw.com.news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/bybee801O2mem.pdf.
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Memo "shook my faith in the integrity of the community of American jurists.
' 3
I believe that those of us shaken and repulsed by Bybee's legal conclusions
should pause long enough to see a bit of ourselves at work in his lawyering. We
should admit that we perceive legal analysis not as a system of reasoning
closed to our own extra-legal judgments as to right or wrong, but as a system
that begins with our own personal judgments and ends with legal ones. While
the benefit of this approach to legal reasoning includes being free from the dead
hands who wrote the law without appreciating the living situations in which it
would need to be applied, one of the costs is we forget that there are reasons
laws are written as they are. While the law's purpose may be to serve humanity
rather than humanity's purposes being to serve the law, as lawyers we must
bear in mind that law serves us best when we presume its wisdom rather than
our own.
To explore these issues, this Essay assumes that, as a moral matter, we
ought not to torture and that there is a determinative consensus among
American lawyers that torture is illegal. a This Essay explores how it is a
particular lawyer, Bybee, could arrive at a conclusion fundamentally at odds
with both our national moral spirit and our law. This is not about legal analysis
but about the legal analyzer. Rather than dismissing Bybee as a political hack
or dishonest lawyer, we can learn much about how we all think, both as humans
responding to threats of violence and insecurity and as lawyers educated and
operating in a professional mindset that does not presume the law's wisdom.
II. THE TORTURE MEMO
5
In response to a Central Intelligence Agency request for legal advice
regarding standards of conduct for interrogation, 6 Bybee, as a member of the
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to the President, signed a memorandum of
law. 7 As a legal matter, the purposes of an OLC memo are to advise the
3 Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 1681, 1687 (2005).
4 See infra notes 14-20.
5 For a convenient summation of the memorandum's history, purpose and contents, see
Marisa Lopez, Professional Responsibility: Tortured Independence in the Office of Legal
Counsel, 57 FLA. L. REv. 685 (2005). See also Richard B. Bidler & Detlev F. Vagts,
Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 689 (2004); David J.
Gottlieb, How We Came to Torture, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 449 (2005).
6 See Priest, supra note 1.
7 The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel assists the
Attorney General in his function as legal advisor to the President and all the executive
branch agencies. The OLC drafts legal opinions of the Attorney General and also provides
its own written opinions and oral advice in response to requests from the Counsel to the
President, the various agencies of the executive branch, and offices within the Department of
Justice. Such requests typically deal with legal issues of particular complexity and
importance or about which two or more agencies are in disagreement. The OLC also is
responsible for providing legal advice to the executive branch on all constitutional questions
and reviews pending legislation for constitutionality. All executive orders and proclamations
proposed to be issued by the President are reviewed by the OLC for form and legality, as are
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President as to the state of the law and to serve as a leal interpretation binding
on the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. Thus, until the Torture
Memo was withdrawn two years later, 9 it was legally binding on the Executive
Branch. The memo reasoned as follows:
18 U.S.C. section 2340A does not prohibit as "torture" merely cruel and
inhuman interrogation techniques, but only those interrogation techniques that
inflict pain akin in severity to death or organ failure.10 But if we are wrong, to
the extent 18 U.S.C. Section 2340A prohibits interrogation techniques the
President approved, the law would violate the American Constitution. This is
because it is inherent in the Presidential office to determine what interrogation
techniques shall be used, and neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has a
greater power than the President on the subject. 1 However, if the President's
commands were found subject to 18 U.S.C. Section 2340A without violating
the Constitution, then, nevertheless, the President's endorsement of such
interrogation techniques could still be justified as a matter of necessity and self-
defense, being the moral choice of a lesser evil: harming an individual enemy
combatant in order to prevent further Al Qaeda attacks upon the United
States. 12
Whereas moral philosophers must isolate the single governing principle to
determine right and wrong, lawyers, of course, are free to assemble a jumble of
principles and back-u arguments. And this is what Bybee did. He cited seven
different dictionaries' to split-out an allegedly legal distinction between merely
various other matters that require the President's formal approval. In addition to serving as,
in effect, outside counsel for the other agencies of the executive branch, the OLC also
functions as general counsel for the Department of Justice itself. It reviews all proposed
orders of the Attorney General and all regulations requiring the Attorney General's approval.
It also performs a variety of special assignments referred by the Attorney General or the
Deputy Attorney General. U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, About OLC,
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
8 For a discussion, see Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A
Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1303, 1305 (2000). See
also William R. Casto, Executive Advisory Opinions and the Practice of Judicial Deference
in Foreign Affairs Cases, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 501 (2005).
9 On December 30, 2004, the OLC issued a memorandum to replace the Bybee Torture
Memo. In the Replacement Memo, the OLC defined torture more broadly than it did in the
Bybee Torture Memo and concluded that it was unnecessary to address issues of presidential
powers because the President had unequivocally stated that the United States would not
participate in torture. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen.,
to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Replacement
Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dahmemodagmemo.pdf.
10 Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 1-13, 46.
" Id. at 1-2, 33-39, 46.
12 Id.
13 In eight pages of the Torture Memo Bybee cites WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1935); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(3d ed. 1992); IX THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1978); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1988); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1986) (note this is the 1986 edition rather than the 1988 edition); RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1999); and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.
1999). Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 5-13.
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cruel and inhuman interrogation practices (those that did not feel like death or
organ failure) and extremely cruel and inhuman practices (those that did). It is
only the latter, Bybee concludes, that is prohibited "torture." 14 He constructed
an aggressive constitutional argument that the President is not subject to the
law only by failing to mention any reasoning, law or history to the contrary.
15
Finally, he rested his legal argument upon a claim to the moral high ground:
since it would be morally necessary to harm an individual enemy combatant in
order to prevent further Al Qaeda attacks upon the United States, it must be
legal. 16
The OLC later disclaimed the memo, 17 and the legal profession's response
to it has been an exceptionally deep and widespread expression of dismay.' 8
14 For a criticism of Bybee's attempts to narrow the definition of "torture" in order to
expand its use, see Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture
Under International Law: The Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 9, 23-30 (2005).
15 For criticism of the Torture Memo's evasion of any counter-arguments on this point,
see, e.g. Bilder & Vagts, supra note 5; Casto, supra note 8, at 503-05. See also
Memorandum from Thomas J. Romig, Major Gen., U.S. Army, Judge Advocate Gen., to
Gen. Counsel, Dep't of the Air Force, Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working
Group to Access Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogations of Detainees
Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism, 151 CONG. REC. S8794 (daily ed.
July 25, 2005).
16 For a criticism of the moral necessity argument in the Torture Memo, see Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan, Torture, Necessity and the Union of Law & Philosophy, 36 RUTGERS L. J.
183 (2004).
17 See Replacement Memo, supra note 9. Additionally, in December 2004, in response
to the concerns raised by the Torture Memo, nineteen former lawyers of the OLC drafted
guidelines for memoranda. Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel, 81 Ind. L.J.
1345 (forthcoming Fall 2006). These guidelines are to be published as part of a symposium
issue of the Indiana Law Journal, War, Terrorism and Torture: Limits on Presidential Power
in the 21st Century. The American Constitution Society sponsored the symposium along
with Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington.
18 See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals,
91 CORNELL L. REv. 67 (2005). Calling it a legal analysis of which no one "could be proud,"
on page 68, Wendel cites several sources identifying not only ethical lapses but blatant
incompetence in the preparation of the memo, such as: a statement by Harold Hongju Koh,
Dean, Yale Law School, that "in my professional opinion, the August 1, 2002 OLC
Memorandum is perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read," quoted
in Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to be Attorney General
of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 158 (2005),
available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate 14ch 109.html; Kathleen Clark
& Julie Mertus, Torturing the Law: The Justice Department's Legal Contortions on
Interrogation, WASH. POST, June 20, 2004, at B3 (criticizing "stunning legal contortions" in
the memo); Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2004, at A14 (quoting Cass Sunstein's opinion that the legal analysis in the memos was
"very low level, ... very weak, embarrassingly weak, just short of reckless"); Ruth
Wedgewood & R. James Woolsey, Op-Ed., Law and Torture, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2004, at
A10 (concluding that the memos "bend and twist to avoid any legal restrictions" on torture
and ignore or misapply governing law). For an exceptionally strong reaction by an
international law scholar and former military lawyer, see Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans
and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of
Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811 (2005) ("Not since the Nazi era have so many
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Many have argued that Bybee is subject to professional discipline for failing to
accurately advise the President as to the true state of the law.19 Perhaps with
only limited hyperbole, David B. Rivkin, Jr., a White House lawyer during the
Reagan administration, claimed that "if you line up 1,000 law professors, only
six or seven would sign up to [the Torture Memo's viewpoint]."
III. WHY?
Why would an otherwise professionally competent lawyer like Bybee
prepare a memo so fundamentally at odds with both the prevailing moral and
legal consensus? Dismissing bad faith or other ad hominem theories, and
adopting a measured sympathy with his situation at the time, one explanation is
that he succumbed to the distortions in moral reasoning that tempt each of us as
a human when we face a fearful moral choice.
John Howard Yoder, the late theologian at The University of Notre
21Dame, identified four ways in which moral consideration of imminent
violence distorts our reasoning: unmitigated individualism, nafve determinism,
a belief that we have complete knowledge (omniscience) and a belief that we
have complete control (omnipotence).
Unmitigated Individualism.22 Fear distorts our reasoning towards an
unmitigated individualism. Fear convinces us that the relevant decisions
to be made and the consequences that follow are exclusively personal
lawyers been so clearly involved in international crimes concerning the treatment and
interrogation of persons detained during war."). For an introduction to these issues, see
Bilder & Vagts, supra note 5.
19 See Richard L. Abel et al., Lawyers' Statement on Bush Administration's Torture
Memos, available at http://www.afj.org/spotlight/0804statement.pdf (last visited Feb. 2,
2006). See also Bilder & Vagts, supra note 5; Lopez, supra note 5.
20 R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos, WASH. POST., July 4,
2004, at A12. Even among the hyperbolically alleged "six or seven" defenders, there is little
defense for the Torture Memo per se but rather a defense either of Bybee's role in writing
the memo as a "legal technician" who was not obligated to be influenced by moral or other
considerations. See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, A 'Torture' Memo and Its Tortuous
Critics, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2004, at A22. For a theoretical defense of torture in specific
situations, see, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the
World? The Circumstances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 581
(2005); Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" And "Postcommitment ": The Ban On Torture
In The Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV 2013 (2003). Or for a general condemnation
of torture as illegal combined with justification of the moral necessity defense for individual
torturers in certain situations, see John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected
Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743 (2002); John T. Parry,
What Is Torture, Are We Doing It, and What if We Are? 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 237 (2003).
Alan Dershowitz is the most widely-known defender of torture in certain situations, though
his defenses are not defenses of the Torture Memo. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to
Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan 22, 2002, at A19.
21 Peter Steinfels, John H. Yoder, Theologian At Notre Dame, Is Dead at 70, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1998, at A17. Professor Yoder was world famous for his work in ethics,
peace studies and theology. His New York Times obituary is available at
http://www.nd.edu/-theo/research/jhy_2 /writings/NYTobit.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
22 JOHN HOWARD YODER, WHAT WOULD You Do? 16, 17-20 (expanded ed. 1992).
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matters. What matters when we are afraid is only what happens to me, my
wife, my husband, my child, mine. Of course, this ignores the social,
religious and institutional contexts in which we live, denying that there is
any relevance or value to someone or anything other than me and mine. It
implies that we, as individuals, rather than other individuals or our social
and religious institutions are morally qualified to settle the matter
because the matter is ours.
Naive Determinism.23 Another distorting effect of fear on moral
reasoning is that it over-simplifies our understanding of causation,
probabilities and possibilities. In a fearful situation, we come to believe
that there are two pre-programmed tracks on which events can go and
that our role is simply to choose which of two tracks to send the events
down. This is a distortion of reality in that it denies that anyone else has
any determinative effect in the outcome, exaggerating our role as
personal decision maker into the role of exclusive decision maker. In fact,
of course, in any situation, all of the parties involved are making
interlocking and contradictory decisions about how to act, each
impinging on the other, each acting at the same time, changing the
situation by their actions. Situations are never static, but fear makes them
seem so-and makes it seem as if there are only two outcomes from the
situation with our choice (and no one else's) being the determining cause.
Fear clouds our perception of the fluidity and dynamics of a situation,
and inhibits our ability to see creative alternatives. Fear keeps us from
observing any options other than fleeing or fighting.
24
Complete Control.25 Fear convinces us that we can have sufficient
control of a situation, if we are only willful enough to do it. Anyone with
more than a televised acquaintance with reality, and especially how
violence transpires in the physical world, knows, of course, that our
willingness to control a situation rarely, if ever, translates into an ability
to control it. Marital arts and quick draws restore order out of fearful
situations in electronic popular culture, but are not the usual means in
reality. Failure to be successful in our attempt to control a frightening
situation is a serious possibility, and a serious moral concern rarely
weighed when we are afraid. So serious is it in the Roman Catholic moral
tradition, the probability of success in a war is one of the elements• • . 26
necessary for its moral justification. Of all we might allege, that we will
defeat the bad guys in the world if we are simply willing to do it must be
among the most empirically baseless.
23 Id. at 12-13, 17-10.
24 Yoder catalogs a variety of examples in which creative alternatives (that is, those
other than fleeing or fighting) have been used to escape violent threats. See id. at 27-29,
32-36. Non-resistant Christians have a history of cataloging anecdotal instances of "third
way" non-resistant responses to violent threats.
25 Id. at 13-15, 17-20.
26 See, e.g., U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, PASTORAL LETTER, THE
CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE (1983), available at
http://www.osjspm.org/cst/cp.htm.
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Complete Knowlee. 27 Finally, but perhaps most influential only next to
the belief that we can control any situation if we are willful enough, is the
belief fear gives us that we have all the relevant knowledge to make a
decision. Not only does fear make us into naive determinists that events
will unfold in one of two inevitable ways based upon our personal
decision (and nothing else), fear convinces us that we know what the
unfolding of those events will be ahead of time. Social situations are far
more complex, and, we all know, life rarely turns out the way we predict.
However, when afraid, we convince ourselves that we can predict exactly
what will happen next as a result of what we choose to do now. We come
to believe we have complete and certain knowledge.
The effects of fear on our moral reasoning are to convince us that we are
omnipotent, omniscient and of greater value than anyone or anything else. Fear
convinces us that our willingness to ignore our inabilities, our uncertainties, our
limitations, our humanity and everyone and everything else is what will
preserve us. In other words, if we let it, fear will overcome every moral,
religious and civic impulse we claim to cherish when we are not afraid.
IV. BYBEE'S FEARS AND THE TORTURE MEMO
That Bybee wrote his memo in a fearful time and place is undeniable.
While today we (rightly) read the memo with the images of Abu Ghraib in our
mind, the images cited by Bybee in his memo were that of the fallen Twin
Towers, the punched Pentagon, and Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the
Taliban poised to destroy. 28 Even if we believe President Bush to be unwise or
immoral in his choices of how to handle the threats to national security after
September 11, we cannot deny that President Bush and every other American
had good reason to be afraid.
Mindful of the fear of the time, we can see that the distortions of the
reasoning in the Torture Memo approximate those Yoder would expect in many
fearful person's moral reasoning.
Unmitigated Nationalism. The only measure of moral or causal
relevance Bybee used in his memorandum was his perception of
immediate American interests. The potential the memorandum had for
having any effect on the billions of individuals who live outside of
American borders went un-noted. Also un-noted was how the
memorandum's conclusions compared with American moral, religious or
civic institutions and histories. Everything Americans claim to cherish
when we're not afraid-due process, presumption of innocence, humane
treatment-was dropped in order to focus on a nationalized version of me
and mine. Everything else was too abstract, and thus irrelevant.
Nafve Determinism. In a fearful situation, we come to believe that there
are two pre-programmed tracks on which events can go and that our role
is simply to choose which of two tracks to send the events down. The
27 YODER, supra note 22, at 15-16.
28 See, e.g., Torture Memo, supra note 2, at 31-33.
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moral calculus that was the ultimate grounds of the memo presented two
options: being attacked again by Al Qaeda or not being attacked. The sole
causal distinction between the two was whether or not enemy combatants
were tortured in order to secure information. There was no consideration
that torture might consistently lead to more inaccurate information than
accurate information, or that Al Qaeda might change its plans because it
knew so-and-so had been captured and was subjected to torture. Bybee
reduced all of the factual, legal and moral questions to one neat but naYve
option: being attacked because we did not torture or being protected
because we did.
Complete Control. Bybee concluded the problem was one that could be
solved simply by our willingness to do something admittedly morally
distasteful in order to avoid something worse being done to us. He
exaggerated the degree of control Americans have, failing to consider
unintended consequences, such as the effects of radicalizing Muslim men
and women into violent fundamentalism; damaging international
relations and world opinion; and the effects on those Americans who did
the torturing, as well as the culture and self-image of the military. In
short, Bybee's conviction was simple and blunt: all that was necessary to
secure Americans was the willingness to be tough enough to torture.
Complete Knowledge. Bybee's analysis was premised on the assumption
that Americans would know who had valuable information and who did
not; what kind of torturous interrogation would deliver valuable
information in an accurate way; and when the interrogation had failed or
succeeded to do just that. The inconsistent assumption was that
"America" had perfect knowledge of who knew what and how to get
them to disclose it, even though we did not know what it was they knew.
Bybee's moral mistakes are rather common. In considering this issue, one
colleague of mine thought he had isolated the moral issue I should consider by
bluntly asking: what if you knew your daughter would be molested and killed
unless you were willing to torture an accomplice who would provide you the
information to stop it? The colleague was confident he had isolated-and
resolved-the issue in his question. This way of framing the issues is an almost
universal knee-jerk response to moral questions of violence.29
The question, however, obscures the most relevant issues under the guise
of isolating the issue of willingness as central: if you are but willing to inflict
this violence, your daughter will be rescued. Assumed into the question is that I
29 The use of such contrivances in legal literature is well-known and rightly criticized.
See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 201, 265 (2004) (criticizing Alan
Dershowitz). Yoder characterized as uncanny how often this type of question was posed to
conscientious objectors as a test of their sincerity when, in fact, it represents the world
working in a way no one would ever dream it to work. Yoder, supra note 22, at 12-17.
William Jennings Bryan reportedly attempted to test Leo Tolstoy's commitment to pacifism
with a contrived hypothetical, to which Tolstoy replied that while in all of his seventy-five
years he had never met the fantastic hypothetical brigand who would murder or molest a
child before his eyes, whereas millions of men had killed and been killed in war. Bryan,
Tolstoy said, "did not let me finish, laughed, and agreed that my argument was satisfactory."
ERNEST J. SIMMONS, LEO TOLSTOY 623 (1946).
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would have sufficient control over this accomplice and abductor and all third
parties and everyone else involved to bend them to my will, if only my will to
violence were sufficiently resolute. These assumptions are entirely inconsistent
with any reasonable assessment of how reality works.
Yet, this type of unreflective response to the threat of violence is how
torture is always justified. 30 Throughout the Torture Memo, Bybee's apparently
sincere though mistaken belief that torturing prisoners would increase rather
than decrease American security determined the reasoning. It certainly wasn't
the law that did. Fearful of the results of concluding the law demanded
otherwise, he concluded it permitted torture when it clearly did not.
In his defense, perhaps we can say his situation was nearly sui generis.
Who among us mere mortal lawyers, after all, has ever been called to give a
legal opinion on such a matter? Most lawyers' legal opinions for clients are
limited to real estate sales, taxes, divorces, probate, and, perhaps, whether to
plea bargain or go to trial against the prosecutor. There are fearful clients in all
those situations, but nothing that compares to Bybee's situation: deciding an
issue of national security with fresh memories of September 11 and the
knowledge that Osama Bin Laden was still free.
While only a few American lawyers can claim to have ever lawyered the
type of situation in which Bybee found himself, what is notable is that those
lawyers most experienced in this type of situation quickly and loudly came
down on the other side. Whereas Bybee had no experience with these types of
issues, the American military lawyers did. Military lawyers have been actively
campaigning against torturing prisoners. Though ignored by the civilian leaders
and civilian lawyers in the Pentagon and the Bush Administration, these
military lawyers have prepared legal memoranda against torture, testified
before Congress against torture, and otherwise attempted to publicize their
concerns that torture does not increase American security but rather decreases
it.3 1 Five of these lawyers have been honored with Medals of Liberty by the
American Civil Liberties Union. 32
In July, 2005 Senator Lindsey Graham, himself a reservist Air Force Judge
Advocate General (JAG) corps lawyer, read six declassified memos into the
Congressional Record. The memos had been written in 2003 by JAG corps
lawyers from every branch of the military in response to the OLC Torture
Memo and related memoranda.33 These military lawyers criticized torturous
interrogation techniques as criminal; 34 inconsistent with how U.S. forces had
30 The response has even been given an appearance of scientific certitude with a
formula intended to "map" the "strength of the case in favor of torture." See Bagaric &
Clarke, supra note 20, at 613.
31 Many of these activities are reflected in 151 CONG. REC. S8772-S8803 (daily ed.
July 25, 2005) and generally described in the popular press. See Lisa Hajjar, An Army of
Lawyers, THE NATION, Dec. 26, 2005, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20051226/hajjar; Josh
White, Pentagon Studies Raising Military Lawyers' Rank, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at
A29.
32 Hajjar, supra note 31.
33 Id.
34 151 CONG. REC. S8772, S8796 (daily ed. July 25, 2005).
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been trained since Vietnam;35 inconsistent with how U.S. forces had operated
in recent history; 36 inconsistent with the "legal and moral 'high-road;' 37
risking adverse impact on American interests worldwide; 38 subjecting the U.S.
to international criticism that the "U.S. is a law unto itself;" 39 putting service
personnel at far greater risks than theg' had been; 40 risking lowering the culture
and self-image of the U.S. forces; and would likely be a disaster if the
information became public in terms of international and domestic support for
the war on terrorism, as well as the public perception of the U.S. military.42
Senator Graham summarized these memoranda:
[Y]ou have to understand ... what the law actually says. The DOJ's
interpretation of the torture statute from a lawyer's point of view was
absurd. And the JAGs were telling the policymakers: If you go down this
road, you are going to get your own people in trouble. You are on a
slippery slope. You are going to lose the moral high ground .... And
they were absolutely right. (emphasis added).43
While Bybee's fears distorted his moral reasoning in the Torture Memo, it
is clear that not all lawyers put into the same situation of advising (or trying to
advise) the President have succumbed to the same temptations Bybee did. The
military lawyers deferred to the law as an accumulation of hard-won
institutional wisdom. They believed the law against torture to be a reality-based
warning to keep us from being doomed to learn the same lessons (usually
referred to as "those from Vietnam") again and again.44 Bybee apparently did
not. Instead, he voiced his own calculation of what should be done rather than
the laws' demands of what should not be done, which did doom the world to
learn lessons "we" have already learned: increasing barbarism decreases
security.
35 id.
36 id.
31 Id. at S8795.
38 Id. at S8794.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at S8797.
44 Although "Vietnam" may be foremost in the American awareness of why violence
must be limited even in times of war, it was after World War II that the nations of the world
began codifying the obligations between combatants they believed civilization required. The
drafters of these obligations-the Geneva Conventions-were individuals who knew about
terrorism and terrorist tactics, as guerilla warfare, reprisals against civilians, terrorism and
sabotage were endemic in World War I1. For a discussion of the Geneva Conventions (which
some have recently declared "obsolete," having failed to remember that World War II was
the worst conflict thus far in human history), see Gottlieb, supra note 5, at 450.
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V. LEGAL INDETERMINACY AND THE AMERICAN LAWYERING
CULTURE
Bybee did not respect the law as an external stop on his personal instinct
of what was best to be done. However, to criticize Bybee for incorporating his
extra-legal moral calculations into this legal analysis is not to suggest that there
is no place where moral and legal reasoning come together. Rather, it is to point
out that the conclusions of the Torture Memo could only be sustained if one
ignores that the moral and legal reasoning on torture dovetail in the statute
itself. In this instance, even if not in others, the hard-earned practical wisdom
and the historical moral consensus were preserved-not threatened-in the
words he was asked to read for his client, the President. This situation was the
inverse of one in which a lawyer may be morally bound to inform his client that
mere reliance on the letter of the law is not advisable because it is so at odds
with the moral spirit. Instead, when presented with the letter of the law
reflecting the moral spirit, Bybee ignored both to report to the President not
what was legal but what was arguably legal.
45
But perhaps the distinction between what is legal and what is merely
arguably legal is too quaint for American lawyers these days. After the 20th
century's realist-turn in legal scholarship,46 most legal scholars argue as to the
degree but agree on the fact that law is, in some sense or another, at one time or
at all times, indeterminate-insufficient on its own terms to generate one
unique legal conclusion over another.47 Some limit indeterminacy to appellate
cases, noting that in those cases there are, by definition, two equally reasonable
interpretations of the law but only one will win.48 Others extend that
observation with the claim that the one that wins out does so by a judge's bias,
45 I owe this concisely complex term to William R. Casto. Casto, supra note 8, at
501-02.
46 Professional philosophers devote their careers to debating the existence of schools of
thought such as realism; what those schools taught; who was or was not a member; and what
their influence was. Rather than engaging such a project for this Essay, I have deferred to the
philosophical experts chosen to address these issues in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds.,
2005). At best, these conclusions as to the influence of these schools of thoughts are true; at
the very least, the generalizations are reasonable assessments under the standards of
professional philosophers, which are standards neither I nor most of the Essay's readers
could aspire to meet on these specific topics.
47 The American legal realism movement was the most influential 20th century
development in American jurisprudence, but it impacted American legal education and
scholarship even more profoundly than formal jurisprudence itself. The realist emphasis on
legal indeterminacy pushed legal education and scholarship into accepting the role of non-
legal forces in judicial decisions with the result that lawyers, law professors, law students,
and even courts now openly discuss "policy" issues as legal ones. So pervasive has been the
revolution, that many today might not realize how radical it really is in historical terms.
Indeed, most legal scholars today follow a realist agenda (e.g., empirical research) without
feeling the need to self-identify as "realists." Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE
BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 59-65 (Martin P.
Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005).
48 This is the root claim of classical Realism. Id. at 51-53.
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education or personal history and quirks.49 Others claim the indeterminacy is
much deeper than appellate cases, and not as obvious as the role of human bias
but as a result of something deep within language itself. 50 Whatever the source
of indeterminacy, there are arguments that the choices that do or should
actually determine the decisions come from race, politics, class, economics, or
business custom. 5' Whatever the degrees, origins and limits of indeterminacy,
the shared agreement is that the law itself is somehow insufficient to generate
all the legal conclusions needed.52
While law professors and other scholars might appreciate the subtleties of
the various approaches and consequences of legal indeterminism, what appears
un-studied is how the classroom discussion of indeterminacy affects those who
are being educated in the vocation of lawyering. How has the 20th century's
emphasis on indeterminacy and the turn of legal scholarship away from the
study of doctrine to the various inter-disciplinary "law and" social science
approaches affected law students who are training to be lawyers and not
philosophers or economists or sociologists? It may be taken by neophyte
lawyers as good reason-and reason with an academic imprint-to view the
role of a lawyer simply as that of a hired gun.53 While non-lawyers have always
expressed concern about the ethics of being a lawyer, in the 20th century the
guardians of the legal profession themselves came to embrace a deep
skepticism in the value of the doctrines of law as sufficient to the profession.
54
49 There are differing theories as how best to explain how legal decisions are made,
assuming they are not made exclusively with reference to legal doctrines. Id. at 54-56.
50 Some Critical Legal Studies theorists argue indeterminacy is rooted in language. Id.
at 62.
51 These differing responses to indeterminacy can be justified in the moderate terms of
Realism itself or in the more radical terms of Critical Legal Studies or those of the law and
economics movement. See id.; Lewis A. Kornhauser, Economic Rationality in the Analysis
of Legal Rules and Institutions, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 67 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005); Mark V.
Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 80 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005).
52 Subsequent to the development of American legal realism much of the disputes
between legal theorists can be understood in terms of the nature and degree of
indeterminacy. The Critical Legal Studies theorists probably exaggerated the nature and role
of indeterminacy, while anti-realists such as H.L.A. Hart (who did more than anyone else to
limit the movement's progress among theorists) conceded indeterminacy but argued it was a
marginal phenomenon. Nevertheless, taking indeterminacy seriously (or even admitting its
existence) is the enduring legacy of the realists. Leiter, supra note 47, at 61-65. Of course,
more classical legal theorists remain in opposition. See, e.g., Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law
Theory, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 15 (Martin
P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005).
53 The students might not be too far astray in their assessment. Legal realist Karl
Llewellyn's advice to lawyers was to use facts to persuade the judge your case is sound and
then to provide a technical ladder so that the judge can reach the result, while legal realist
Jerome Frank endorsed the view that lawyers ought to make the judge want to decide the
case in their favor and then, and only then, to cite precedents to justify the judge's
determination. Leiter, supra note 47, at 53.
54 It is one phenomenon for a religion's critics to charge its adherents with rampant
hypocrisy, but another for its chief clerics to publicly announce it to be fundamentally
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If a law student absorbs from one professor the idea that the law is a tool of the
economically privileged; from another the idea that the law is a series of
arbitrary choices between reasonable alternatives; from another that the law
must be interpreted with reference to economics or business custom; and from
another that the law is inherently this or that or the other, it is quite
understandable for the student to conclude that there is no difference between
what is legal and what is arguably legal, and it is the lawyer's job to make sure.
As lawyers, we cannot simply pretend that we have not noticed the
insufficiency of the doctrines of the law in understanding the law as a subject.
But we cannot be the eternal sophomore, who having just discovered the
humanity of social institutions-whether it is that human hands have written
our religious texts or that our laws did not drop ready-made from the sky-
concludes that our social institutions are arbitrary. The dual insight of the
mature lawyer is that the law is human, and as such, necessarily frail and
fallible-but not necessarily arbitrary.
The JAG corps lawyers involved in criticizing the Torture Memo had that
dual insight. They understood the laws against torture as institutionalized
historical wisdom warning future generations away from the mistakes of past
ones. Perhaps they have it because many of them, if not all of them, had lived
through those past mistakes, so casually referred to throughout their
memoranda simply with references to Vietnam.
Bybee did not see the law's prohibition against torture as a warning away
from torture, but rather as a requirement that he articulate what he thought his
client wanted in language that kept it from being the prohibited "torture. 55 The
President was given the power to give the law its meaning, rather than being
told what it was the law meant. While a curious approach to the law for
someone who claims to be an originalist, 56 it is not one any American lawyer
could pretend to be shocked by. After all, he gave his client what he apparently
thought his client wanted: a green light.
baseless (and yet another for them to announce it to be fundamentally baseless but still insist
on their tithes and vestments). What has occurred in legal education during the 20th century
is analogous to the latter two.
55 There is no evidence that Bybee was expressly instructed to conclude certain
techniques would not be considered "torture," but it seems reasonable to infer he at least
thought these conclusions would be viewed favorably. Alberto R. Gonazles explained the
standing orders from the President on the subject with an ambiguously-phrased directive he
attributed directly to the President: "Make sure it is lawful. Make sure it meets all of our
obligations under the Constitution, U.S. federal statutes and applicable treaties." Mike Allen
& Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush, WASH. POST, June 9, 2004, at A3,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26401-2004Jun8.html
(emphasis added). The ambiguity is with the "make sure" command. Did it mean (a)
constructing a legal analysis that concluded certain identified actions would be considered
legal or (b) identifying certain actions as legal and others as illegal in order to ensure that
only the former were taken?
56 See JUDICIAL REVIEW PROJECT, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, REPORT ON JAY S. BYBEE
(Feb. 2, 2003), available at http://iudicialreview.stanford.edu/Reports/bybee.pdf
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VI. WHAT CAN WE EXPECT OF AMERICAN LAWYERS?
If we, as lawyers, are honest with ourselves, would we expect other
American lawyers to do what Bybee did? Probably. If he or she believes the
President should be given what the President wants, I do not think most
American lawyers working for a President would think twice about getting that
done. It might take several all-nighters, various treatises and multiple binders of
legislative histories, but, I suspect, most American lawyers would do the same.
While we may abhor the substance of his conclusions, privately at least, we
must admit his process was the same as any other American lawyer's.
In Bybee's situation, we can reasonably infer that there were two powerful
forces at work to motivate him to focus on the arguably legal rather than the
certainly legal. One was this idea of working as a hired gun to do the client's
bidding, which I suspect-but cannot prove-is the practical consequence
many law students draw from vocational education in an academic environment
that not only admits but is fascinated with legal indeterminacy.57 This provides
the intellectual space in the "legal" argument for supplementing the law with
substantial extra-legal considerations in arriving at a conclusion as to what the
law requires.
The second force was giving into the common distortions in moral
reasoning that often afflict us when we are scared of violence. This provides the
lawyer's motivation to fill that open intellectual space in the argument provided
by indeterminacy, and to fill it with the confidence that she knows what needs
to be done and how to make it happen, ignoring her own inabilities,
uncertainties, limitations and obligations to anyone or anything other than her
client's objective. Whether or not lawyers are more inclined to ethical lapses
when their clients are in dangerous or highly fearful situations-or when the
lawyer has an empathetic sense of the client's fear-has apparently not been
systematically studied. But it certainly seems likely.
58
One type of fear that Bybee did not have to face was the fear of "getting
caught." Perhaps the greatest approximation of ethical behavior we have among
American lawyers is their fear of clients losing because the lawyer's advice
proves inadequate, and then those clients suing them for malpractice. Although
academic legal indeterminacy may have helped convince generations of
practicing lawyers that being a hired gun is intellectually honest, all of them
know what they are being hired to do: to win. That keeps the legal advice from
ever being excessively aggressive or idiosyncratic, even when the lawyer has
an empathetic fear for the client. After all, even the family lawyer wanting to
protect a battered spouse from further abuse would think twice about falsifying
57 Perhaps legal indeterminacy is simply more interesting to most law professors than
discussions of consideration in contracts, negligence in torts, capacity in wills, or income for
tax purposes.
58 Since clients only seek lawyers when they have some fear of loss (of money,
business or freedom), the effect of fear in lawyers' ethics ought to be studied (as well as
whether or not working in a pervasive context of fear has a significant part in lawyers' self-
reported low quality of life and high risks of alcoholism and depression).
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an affidavit, since it simply might not work to get the job done. Thus, in the
world of lawyering, the motive to embrace mere willingness to win regardless
of the law's demands is kept in check by the risk of failure.
When giving legal advice to the President, there is not the usual kind of
counter-balancing fear of getting caught in a failure. By "usual kind," I mean
the chance of being sued for malpractice, which doesn't affect government
lawyers. 59 1 also mean the special role government lawyers have in advising the
government. It's a circular dynamic: the government's interpretation of the law
becomes the de facto law for some practical purposes. 60 Government lawyers
are subject to additional ethical rules to push them to focus on what is legal
rather than merely arguably legal for exactly this reason. 61 It is these special
ethical rules for government lawyers that Bybee perhaps violated, and why
technically he might be subject to disbarment. The risk of "getting caught" the
government lawyer avoids is replaced by a much more dangerous type of
"getting caught," such as what happened at Abu Ghraib. It's a public risk, not a
private one. It's also a risk Bybee deemed so low that he was willing to be what
is, in hindsight, excessively aggressive and idiosyncratic in his legal analysis.
VII. WHAT CAN WE EXPECT OF AMERICANS?
Perhaps the empirical answer to what we can expect of American lawyers
is the same as what we can expect of Americans. So long as there are American
leaders willing to order, encourage or permit torture; Americans willing to
carry it out; and couches full of TV and internet-addicted Americans who
believe our will to violence is our will to security, there is no reason to believe
that there are not American lawyers in proportion. The electronic information
and entertainment culture strengthens the mistaken responses to reality that
justifying torture requires. With physical social world experience being
replaced by digitalized, isolated, smell-free, two-dimensional images over
which Americans have instant and complete (remote) control, how can this not
encourage feelings of complete control over reality? With TV and radio
stations and web sites flooding Americans with data, information, opinions and
political spin, how can this not encourage feelings of complete knowledge
about reality? With endless cultural images of the good guys overcoming bad
guys simply because they are tough enough to do it, how can this not encourage
individualism and determinism among us? Once we believe we know
everything we need to know, and that our willingness to defeat evil is
59 Of course, government lawyers do run a risk of social and professional
embarrassment for having their positions reversed upon review by courts. However, private
sector lawyers have that same risk but also the risk of losing their retirement and their
children's college education. Judge Bybee has been able to endure whatever level of
embarrassment he has suffered with the security and the perspective of the federal bench.
60 Because of this circular dynamic, the Torture Memo came to function as the virtual
trigger for action that is usually reserved in our divided governmental system for judge's
words, which are intended to be the only words of law that unleash the state's violence.
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1613-14 (1986).
61 See, e.g., Bilder & Vagts, supra note 5, at 693.
[Vol. 10:3
FEAR AND THE AMERICAN LAWYERING CULTURE
synonymous with our willingness to use violence, and we do not pause to
ponder if we might be wrong, or if we might be ineffectual, or if we might not
understand, then we are ready to torture. At that point, it's a mere syllogism to
safety.
Perhaps the more determinative influence is the fact that Americans
simply misunderstand violence, perhaps because most Americans live safely
away from it. Americans notoriously over-estimate the prevalence of violence,
mistaking these safest times in our history for the most violent. 62 In their
support for torture, they also over-estimate violence's effectiveness. The
military lawyers know that violence must be the last resort not because it is so
powerful or efficient but because it is unwieldy and unpredictable, including
with respect to its effects on those who use it. YThe military law's distinction
between the naive, crude and unmanageable violence of torture and the
managed, channeled, and targeted violence of legitimate military operations is
too refined for some Americans, all of whom no doubt are relatively safe from
either kind.
A friend who served in the JAG corps earning a Bronze Star for his
heroism during the Vietnam War told me of a disastrous dinner he had with a
neighborhood friend after the Abu Ghraib abuses became public. Encouraged
by the wine, the dinner date began to opine on the state of the world's affairs,
bad-mouthing those terrorist-coddlers who did not understand that torture was
simply a part of war. The decorated war veteran insisted that this was not true,
that he had spent much of his war time career keeping these inhumane abuses
from being considered a legitimate part of war. He tried to persuade her that
torture made Americans less secure rather than more. She would have none of
it. At this point, he suggested to her that if she were so committed, she should
insist her son leave medical school to join the effort. This apparently made the
conversation too personal, as she refused to continue it.
VIII.WHAT CAN WE LEARN?
George Santayana's claim that "[t]hose who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it"64 is not quite right. The truth is messier. Some who
know the lessons from history are doomed to suffer through them again
because others refuse to learn. And some who refuse to learn are protected from
the doom, while others who have yet had the chance to learn must suffer. The
JAG corps lawyers' anxiety is because they have learned the lessons but are
now (along with the rest of the world) doomed to suffer the consequences of
ignorance yet again. Bybee seems quite likely to remain personally secure, but
62 See, e.g., JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1997).
63 The concern over how the use of torturous interrogation techniques might affect the
self-image and culture of the U.S. military was expressed repeatedly by the various JAG
Corps memoranda reported into the Congressional Record. See 151 CONG. REC. S8772-
S8803 (daily ed. July 25, 2005).
64 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 82 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1954)
(1905).
2006]
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW
the world itself is less secure. Our children are doomed to learn through their
experience of the increasing barbarity of the world what Bybee might have
learned from simply reading the law: thou shall not torture.
65
But what are we, as lawyers to learn? We might generalize that there are
situations in which "normal" lawyering is out of place. The type of lawyering
Bybee employed in the Torture Memo-tightly defining significant terms to
locate the spot on the continuum of possibilities where he wanted it-may be
out of place in the government or with respect to certain activities, such as
torture, domestic abuse and police brutality. Instead, we might ask ourselves, is
there something wrong with "normal" lawyering-the kind of lawyering that
envisions compliance with the law as a means to an end rather than an end in
and of itself? If the distinction between "legal" and "arguably legal" is too
quaint for lawyers in this post-modem era, the claim that there might be
anything ultimate about the law-that the law might exist as an end unto
itself-is likely more so.
What troubles most of us about the Torture Memo is that it does not treat
the intentional infliction of private pain for public purposes as a violation of the
inherently sacred. When the European Convention on Human Rights was
proposed, Mr. F.S. Cocks, one of the United Kingdom's delegates urging its
acceptance argued, "I say that to take the straight beautiful bodies of men and
women and to maim and mutilate them by torture is a crime against high
heaven and the holy spirit of man. I say that it is a sin against the Holy Ghost
for which there is no forgiveness.' 66 Far removed from any invocation of the
Divine, the Torture Memo assumes there is a continuum of maiming and
mutilating somewhere along which there is a line between "legal" and "illegal,"
and the line is to be divined in the normal lawyering fashion, which presumes
the law to be an obstacle for our navigation rather than a guide for our
submission. Without this presumption, the Torture Memo could not have been
written as it was-nor, we must admit, could most of the memoranda American
lawyers write.
The law against torture is designed to deter torture when torture is most
tempting, and it is most tempting when we fear for our safety and that of our
families, friends and nation. It is to guide us to the right result even when we
are pulled the other way by deep, human and powerful forces. But is the law
against torture a special kind of law, or does it manifest the special-ness of law
itself? Can we in an age of realist-saturated legal scholarship and a hired-gun
self-perception among lawyers nurture among ourselves a deeper respect of the
law? Perhaps the lesson is not only to remind us that increasing barbarism
decreases security, but to force us to admit that we are not as shocked by
Bybee's lawyering as we may wish we were (or publicly pretend to be).
Perhaps the lesson for lawyers is not to indulge in self-righteous condemnation
65 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2000).
66 Waldron, supra note 3, at 1710. Waldron's article also includes an excellent
discussion exploring the "sacredness" of the prohibition against torture without resorting to
religious principles.
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of Bybee, but to realize his sins, though more public and of greater
consequence than most lawyers', are no different in kind.

